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1. Introduction
Survey data form the basis of much empirical economic research. Accordingly
its quality and the various determinants thereof, as well as the implications of
data deﬁciencies deserve the attention of researchers.
Within the range of data problems and quality concerns some garnered
more attention in the social sciences than others: The disciplines of sociology
and psychology, where interest often focuses on subjective statements, are
mainly concerned with eﬀects of the interview situation or interviewer inﬂu-
ences: 1 If respondents seek interviewers’ respect, their answers may deviate
from the truth. Unit non-response and sample representativeness are issues
raised in the economic literature (cf., Hill and Willis 2001; Horowitz and
Manski 1998). Here also measurement error and recall bias ﬁnd attention.2 In
contrast, the problem of item non-response is largely neglected. This is
astounding as the loss of information due to item non-response could be even
more problematic than respondent dropout from a survey.
Given the typically high rates of item non-response on sensitive issues such
as income and wealth, it is important to learn about the determinants of non-
response behavior. An understanding of the mechanisms driving item non-
response may permit the development of techniques to reduce it and thus to
substantively increase the value of interviews. It might improve researchers’
ability to rigorously deal with non-response in their analyses, and ﬁnally, it may
yield important insights to improve imputation procedures for missing data.
This study investigates such mechanisms and addresses the following
questions: First, does the matching of interviewers to respondents aﬀect
respondents’ willingness to provide information? This could be the case if
‘observational closeness’ between the interview partners helps to build up the
level of trust required to reveal private information. If this were the case,
survey administrators might be able to improve data quality by carefully
pairing interviewers and respondents. Second, we analyze whether oﬀering
the option of ‘‘don’t know’’ answers in questionnaires helps increase the
amount of information provided, and, third, we investigate whether there is
measurable heterogeneity in the response propensity for diﬀerent types of
ﬁnancial questions. Little evidence exists on these last two issues. If item non-
response propensities depend on the way the question is posed and diﬀer for
diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial questions it might be possible to utilize the ﬁndings
to optimize survey strategies and to improve informational outcomes.3
The interdisciplinary literature on respondent behavior in surveys uses two
prominent theoretical frameworks, the cognitive and the rational choice
model. The cognitive model distinguishes several stages in the process of
answering a question always focusing on cognitive challenges they pose for
the respondent. The rational choice approach (Esser 1984) suggests that the
respondent evaluates behavioral alternatives such as answering or refusing to
answer based on their expected consequences and chooses what maximizes
expected utility. One further issue in models of respondent behavior is that of
1 For careful discussions of these problems see Esser (1984) or Reinecke (1991).
2 See the special issues of the Journal of Human Resources (1998.2, 2001.3) and sources cited
there.
3 For a survey of possible procedures see Juster and Smith (1997).
522 R. T. Riphahn, O. Serﬂing
trust in the interview situation. If a respondent distrusts an interviewer he is
less ready to invest eﬀort to recall or reveal information.
The empirical literature on item non-response yields four main ﬁndings:4
(i) item non-response on income questions is concentrated in the tails of the
income distribution; (ii) there seems to be little systematic variation in item
non-response behavior; (iii) the predictions based on the cognitive model and
the ‘‘trust’’ framework ﬁnd support and interviewer-respondent matching
aﬀect survey success; (iv) the cognitive requirement and sensitivity of an issue
reduce respondents’ willingness to answer.
One limitation of this literature is its focus on the income question: Het-
erogeneity in the level of cognitive challenges and item-speciﬁc sensitivities
across ﬁnancial outcomes have been neglected so far.5 Also, the literature
does not investigate the role of framing: If individuals show diﬀerent
responses depending on how a question is formulated, this information is
relevant for the design of future surveys.6
We add to this literature in various ways. We exploit excellent data from
the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), which contains information on
respondent and interviewer characteristics, thus permitting research on the
relevance of interviewer-respondent matches. We consider item non-response
for a variety of income and wealth outcomes and investigate the character-
istics of the don’t know answer option.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity in item non-response across ﬁnancial
questions. Our data reveal that there is not much to be gained for the
informational value of surveys by matching interviewers and respondents,
once age and gender eﬀects are controlled for. Our third result with respect to
‘‘don’t know’’ answer options is that the observed and unobserved charac-
teristics of ‘‘don’t know’’ respondents are neither close to those providing
informative answers nor to those refusing to respond. Therefore the ‘‘don’t
know’’ responses should be considered as a separate group. Simple statements
as to whether oﬀering a ‘‘don’t know’’ answer option takes away from valid
answers or from non-responses are not feasible. This also implies that missing
data imputations should use diﬀerent procedures depending on whether
missing values derive from ‘‘don’t know’’ answers or non-responses.
2. Hypotheses and empirical approach
2.1. Detailed hypotheses
The theoretical frameworks describe individual item non-response behavior
as determined by the relationship between respondent and interviewer, as well
4 For prior studies see Lillard et al. (1986), Zweimu¨ller (1992), Juster and Smith (1997), Kna¨uper
et al. (1997), Souza-Poza and Henneberger (2000), Biewen (2001), Schra¨pler (2001), or Hill and
Willis (2001).
5 Exceptions are Schra¨pler (2001) who also investigates subjective concerns and Loosveldt et al.
(1999) who look at political preferences.
6 Framing is much discussed in the literature on attitude surveys. Trometer (1996) summarizes the
evidence there which suggests that oﬀering respondents a ‘‘don’t know’’ answer aﬀects responses
in important ways.
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as by the costs and beneﬁts of providing an answer. The literature opera-
tionalized these aspects by interpreting respondent and interviewer charac-
teristics in the light of their eﬀects on trust, and cost-beneﬁt considerations.
If trust aﬀects response behavior, sending a new interviewer to a given
household should generate fewer informative responses than sending a well
known interviewer. Thus an interviewer change in a panel survey is hypoth-
esized to increase item non-response. Further, we expect that a match in
relevant characteristics of interviewer and respondent increases response
propensities, because it may aﬀect respondents’ perception of the interview-
ers’ trust-worthiness.
In general, we assume that non-response propensities increase with the
cost and decline with perceived beneﬁts of answering. Costs and beneﬁts vary
with the type of question, the characteristics of the interview partners and the
interview situation. As a respondent’s cognitive ability may determine the
eﬀort required to answer a question, and as the cognitive ability may be
correlated to education, we expect a negative correlation between high edu-
cation and non-response. A factor that might be correlated with the perceived
beneﬁt derived from survey participation is the appreciation of public service.
Existing studies suggest that this is particularly high among public sector
employees, who in turn seem to be more ready to participate and provide
information in surveys (e.g., Biewen 2001).
The costs and beneﬁts of an interview might also be aﬀected by the
characteristics of the interview situation. One might e.g. take the size of a
person’s town of residence as an indicator of a general attitude of openness
and trust. This is based on evidence showing that individuals refuse to par-
ticipate in surveys because of fear of crimes and that larger cities often entail a
sense of anonymity, where the limits of privacy are guarded more carefully
than in rural areas.7 Similarly, it might be easier for individuals to com-
municate with an interviewer if they are used to such exchanges. Therefore,
residents in large households might be more at ease answering questions and
providing information. Another characteristic of the interview situation is
whether a respondent answers a questionnaire partly in writing as opposed to
an oral interview. As it should be easier and less costly to refuse an answer if
this does not have to be communicated to the interviewer it is plausible to
expect higher item non-response in this situation.
2.2. Empirical approach
In our model of response behavior, we follow a rational choice framework
and consider factors discussed in the literature. When asked a survey question
individual i may respond in J diﬀerent ways (e.g., provide a valid answer, not
respond at all, or - if possible - answer ‘‘don’t know’’).8 In the framework of a
random utility model, we can describe utility u resulting for individual i from
behavior option j as follows:
7 De Maio (1980) found signiﬁcantly more survey cooperation among rural than among urban
dwellers.
8 We consider the event of the interview, the selection of the respondent, and the fact that the
individual is in principle willing to respond to the survey as being exogenously given.
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uij ¼ cija1j þ bija2j þ Xib1j þ Wmb2j þ ðX i WmÞb3j þ lij ð1Þ
where cij and bij represent the costs and beneﬁts of answer option j, a and b
are coeﬃcients, and l is random noise. Also, respondent (i) and interviewer
(m) characteristics (X,W), and their interactions may aﬀect the utility con-
nected to a given behavioral response. Summarizing the right hand side
variables in vector z and the coeﬃcients in vector c, our random utility model
is
uij ¼ zijcj þ lij ð2Þ
The probability that individual i chooses option j is then
Pr (option j is chosen jc;b;X ;W Þ¼ Pr ðuij > uikjc;b;X ;W Þ
¼ Pr ðzijcj zikck > lik lijjc;b;X ;W Þ
for all k 6¼ j;k¼ 1;2; . . .J ; ð3Þ
which must hold jointly for all J-1 alternative options k. Assuming a distri-
bution for lik - lij the resulting cumulative distribution function can be
estimated by maximum likelihood.
Within this framework we investigate three issues: First, we describe
whether item non-response rates diﬀer across outcomes, and study whether
such diﬀerences are associated with observable and unobservable determi-
nants of item non-response.9 For an intuitive indication of outcome-speciﬁc
heterogeneity we pool item non-response outcomes across questions and test
the signiﬁcance of question speciﬁc covariate eﬀects in addition to question
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
Second, we investigate whether the match between interviewer and
respondent aﬀects response behavior, by controlling for interactions between
interviewer and respondent characteristics. We hypothesize that individuals
feel more conﬁdent reporting ﬁnancial information to someone of their own
characteristics as suggested by with Sousa-Poza and Henneberger: ‘‘One
potential source of nonresponse is the existence of a mis-match between the
characteristics of the interviewer and the characteristics of the respondent.’’x
(2000, p.83)
Finally, response probabilities might be aﬀected by the way questions are
posed (for evidence see e.g., Trometer 1996 and sources cited there). How-
ever, these studies typically do not focus on ﬁnancial measures, and an
analysis of the eﬀect of alternative answer options for ﬁnancial questions is
missing in the literature.10 Our data contains some questions with the option
of answering ‘‘don’t know’’, and others without this option. We ﬁrst describe
item non-response rates for both. Then, we perform two tests to ﬁnd out
9 If e.g. wealth items are considered a more private issue than income, the cost of revealing wealth
may exceed that of income and we expect higher non-response for wealth. Similarly, if
information on wealth is less familiar and diﬃcult to obtain, we expect diﬀerences in response
based on cognitive ease.
10 Juster and Smith (1997) concentrate on ﬁnancial measures but focus on the impact of adding
follow-up bracket answer options for ‘‘don’t know’’ and non-response outcomes and for
imputation results.
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whether response processes yielding ‘‘don’t know’’ answers diﬀer from those
yielding non-responses or informative answers.
Both tests are applied within the framework of the multinomial logit
estimator. The ﬁrst tests the assumption underlying this estimator that the
disturbances of alternative (answer-) outcomes are uncorrelated. This ’inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA) property states that the set of out-
come alternatives is correctly speciﬁed only if the estimates do not vary with
the set of considered outcomes (Hausman and McFadden 1984).11 This will
be investigated applying a Hausman test. If the Hausman test yields that the
unobservable determinants of the three outcomes – valid response, ‘‘don’t
know’’ answer, and item non-response – are uncorrelated, this provides a ﬁrst
piece of evidence for the independence of the ‘‘don’t know’’ answer alterna-
tive. If uncorrelatedness is rejected, ‘‘don’t know’’ answers are not truly
independent outcomes. In that case further investigation into the similarity to
response or non-response alternatives is required.
The second test looks at whether the observable determinants of the three
possible outcomes are correlated. The test was suggested by Cramer and
Ridder (1991) but had also been performed before by Hill (1983). Cramer and
Ridder (1991) describe the condition under which a subset of multinomial
logit outcomes may be treated as a single state. They assume uncorrelated
unobservables and describe a criterion by which one may choose the most
parsimonious set of outcomes: If the slope coeﬃcients of two outcome op-
tions do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly, the two options may be combined.12 If the
mechanisms determining the choice of a ‘‘don’t know’’ answer do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from those determining valid answers, these processes are very
similar, and it might well be that oﬀering a ‘‘don’t know’’ answer option takes
away from valid answers. Similarly, we can test whether the mechanisms
leading to ‘‘don’t know’’ answers and non-responses are close. These tests
provide a second indicator as to whether the availability of a ‘‘don’t know’’
answer option takes away from valid answers, or whether this reply is a
substitute for non-responses. In the former case oﬀering ‘‘don’t know’’
answers reduces the informative value of the survey.
3. Data description
3.1. Dataset and sample
Our data are taken from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). The
GSOEP gathers information on German households and individuals peri-
odically adding topical modules to the survey (SOEP Group 2001). Since the
11 The classic illustration of the IIA property looks at alternative means of public transport.
While taxi, train, and bus constitute valid alternatives, a split between red and blue buses most
likely violates the IIA assumption: One would assume that the unobservable determinants of the
choice between red and blue buses are correlated. We test whether don’t know answers are a ‘‘red
bus’’ as opposed to being an independent alternative such as the train.
12 Hill (1983) investigated whether females consider the decision to enter the labor force as an
employee as being distinct from the choice to enter the labor force as a family worker. Similar
tests were performed by Flinn and Heckman (1983), and Riphahn (1997).
526 R. T. Riphahn, O. Serﬂing
1988 module was devoted to household wealth we evaluate item non-response
for that year, when 4,814 households with 10,023 individuals were inter-
viewed. Our data are taken from three questionnaires. The individual survey
was administered to everybody aged 16 or older, whereas the household and
wealth questionnaires were answered by heads of households.13 We also take
advantage of data describing GSOEP interviewers (cf., Schra¨pler and Wagner
2001), which is matched to respondent records.
The GSOEP applies various interview methods: Individuals can answer
questions orally, they can ﬁll in the questionnaire themselves with or without
interviewer support, questionnaires may be sent out by mail, or answered via
telephone. Generally interviewers are required to perform oral interviews, but
they may use diﬀerent formats depending on the situation.
To circumvent language problems, we select German respondents from
the GSOEP’s nationally representative subsample. We disregard observations
where the survey was administered other than by meeting the interviewer in
person as we are interested in the interaction between interviewer and
respondent. This induces a loss of between 35 and 25 % of observations.14
We also drop observations where information on the interviewer is missing.
3.2. Dependent and explanatory variables
Dependent variables. The ﬁnancial variables of interest are taken from the
individual, household, and wealth questionnaires. Table 1 describes measures
gathered in the individual and household survey. Due to ﬁltering mechanisms
in the questionnaire the sample sizes vary by question.15 The last column of
Table 1 describes the item non-response rate for each measure. The rates vary
markedly between 15 % for income from self-employment and less than 3 %
for the ‘‘Christmas bonus’’, a common employment beneﬁt in Germany.
Averaging across all outcomes, we obtain a non-response rate of 5.0 % for
individual income variables.
Based on cognitive ease, one might assume that providing last month’s
earnings should require less eﬀort than last year’s average monthly income.
However, item non-response on the former is about twice that for the latter.
If it is the sense of privacy that determines the cost of reporting earnings, this
outcome may indicate that current earnings are more sensitive than those of
the past. Generally regulated payments, such as vacation or retirement
transfers seem to involve lower reporting costs - possibly because they are
considered as less private - than those that entail information on labor market
success (e.g. unemployment beneﬁts, or earnings).
13 The GSOEP has no strict deﬁnition of the ‘‘head of household’’. Instead it surveys a
knowledgeable person for every household and tries to re-interview that same person in
subsequent surveys (Hanefeld 1987).
14 Preliminary results (not presented) conﬁrm prior studies which show that the presence of an
interviewer strongly aﬀects item non-response (cf., Lillard et al. 1986; Schra¨pler 2001). For details
on GSOEP interview methods and the sample selection see Tables 1 and 2 in Riphahn and
Serﬂing (2002).
15 E.g. only those who had indicated employment were asked about labor incomes, or those who
were retired could indicate retirement beneﬁts.
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The wealth questionnaire typically asked whether the household holds a
given asset and, if so, at which value. If the respondent indicated possession
of a given item but could not provide the exact amount, the person was ﬁrst
asked to guess, and if that failed in most cases answer categories or a ‘‘don’t
know’’ reply were oﬀered. Column 2 in Table 2 shows that the number of
cases for each measure varies. The rates of non-response and ‘‘don’t know’’
answers diﬀer strongly across items. The highest refusal rates of about 30 %
are observed for questions on stock, bond, and equity ownership, which
agrees with the ﬁndings of Juster and Smith (1997). The ‘‘don’t know’’ re-
sponses are distributed diﬀerently: The highest rates appear for equity (15 %)
and inheritances (16.6 %). As the value of these items seems diﬃcult to
determine, ‘‘don’t know’’ likely reﬂects lack of knowledge. This seems less
plausible in the case of monthly life insurance payments, where the respon-
dent should be familiar with a ﬁgure showing up regularly on bank state-
ments. Here a 10.9 % ‘‘don’t know’’ rate seems high.
While the non-response rates inTable 2 donot diﬀermarkedly from those in
Table 1, the joint share of non-response and don’t know answers more than
doubles these rates. Two factors might explain this diﬀerence: Either, oﬀering
an answer option ‘‘don’t know’’ induces individuals who may have otherwise
provided an answer to indicate ignorance. Alternatively, wealth is either more
sensitive than income or it is more diﬃcult to know the correct answer.
Table 1. Item non-response rates for individual and household income questions
Type of income Number of cases 1 Non-responses
N Share
Questions from individual questionnaire
Income from self employment 2 274 42 15.3%
Bonus / proﬁt sharing 2 106 13 12.3%
Other beneﬁts 2 30 3 10.0%
Unemployment transfers 2 196 18 9.2%
Gross earnings last month 2,546 211 8.3%
Earnings from other employment 2 140 9 6.4%
Net earnings last month 2,546 135 5.3%
End of year payment: 13. & 14. monthly salary 2 1,031 26 2.5%
Gross wage last calendar year 2 2,454 91 3.7%
Vacation beneﬁts 2 1,501 47 3.1%
Christmas bonus 2 1,149 33 2.9%
Retirement beneﬁts 2 983 26 2.6%
Total all individual questions: 12,956 654 5.0%
Questions from household questionnaire
Interest and dividend income (last year) 2,149 312 14.5%
Monthly household net income (amount) 2,769 84 3.0%
Total all household questions: 3 14,733 716 4.9%
Notes: 1 Number of cases indicating receipt of income or transfer.
2 Average gross monthly amount in the last calendar year. If the respondent was unable to
provide exact ﬁgure the questionnaire prompted for an approximation.
3 Ten income and transfer categories are not listed separately to save space. For details see
Riphahn and Serﬂing (2002, Table 4).
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP.
528 R. T. Riphahn, O. Serﬂing
T
a
b
le
2
.
It
em
n
o
n
-r
es
p
o
n
se
ra
te
s
fo
r
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
w
ea
lt
h
q
u
es
ti
o
n
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
a
ss
et
1
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
ca
se
s
N
o
n
-r
es
p
o
n
se
‘‘
D
o
n
’t
k
n
o
w
’’
T
o
ta
l
N
S
h
a
re
N
S
h
a
re
N
S
h
a
re
E
q
u
it
y
in
a
b
u
si
n
es
s
1
6
4
4
3
2
6
.2
%
2
5
1
5
.2
%
6
8
4
1
.5
%
S
to
ck
s
a
n
d
b
o
n
d
s
6
3
6
2
1
7
3
4
.1
%
2
7
4
.2
%
2
4
4
3
8
.4
%
H
o
m
e
lo
a
n
sa
v
in
g
s
ce
rt
iﬁ
ca
te
s
(B
a
u
sp
a
rv
er
tr
a
g
)
1
,0
0
1
1
5
0
1
5
.0
%
8
2
8
.2
%
2
3
2
2
3
.2
%
In
h
er
it
a
n
ce
s
si
n
ce
1
9
6
0
3
9
2
2
3
5
.9
%
6
5
1
6
.6
%
8
8
2
2
.4
%
L
if
e
In
su
ra
n
ce
2
,6
6
0
4
8
1
.8
%
2
9
0
1
0
.9
%
3
3
8
1
2
.7
%
P
ro
p
er
ty
o
th
er
th
a
n
o
cc
u
p
ie
d
ﬂ
a
t
o
r
h
o
m
e
3
0
6
6
2
.0
%
2
0
6
.5
%
2
6
8
.5
%
S
a
v
in
g
s
a
cc
o
u
n
t
2
,0
6
4
7
0
3
.4
%
9
7
4
.7
%
1
6
7
8
.1
%
O
w
n
ed
h
o
m
e:
M
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
1
,0
6
5
8
0
.8
%
7
4
6
.9
%
8
2
7
.7
%
T
o
ta
l
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
w
ea
lt
h
2
,4
2
7
3
2
1
.3
%
1
2
4
5
.1
%
1
5
6
6
.4
%
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
d
eb
t
7
7
1
7
0
.9
%
2
5
3
.2
%
3
2
4
.2
%
T
o
ta
l
a
ll
:
1
1
,4
8
6
6
0
4
5
.3
%
8
2
9
7
.2
%
1
,4
3
3
1
2
.5
%
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
su
rv
ey
ﬁ
rs
t
p
o
se
d
y
es
/
n
o
q
u
es
ti
o
n
s
a
s
to
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
o
w
n
s
a
g
iv
en
a
ss
et
.
T
h
en
th
e
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
w
a
s
p
ro
m
p
te
d
fo
r
th
e
ex
ta
ct
a
m
o
u
n
t
h
el
d
in
th
is
ty
p
e
o
f
a
ss
et
,
o
r
fo
r
a
n
es
ti
m
a
te
.
If
th
a
t
w
a
s
n
o
t
p
ro
v
id
ed
,
re
sp
o
n
se
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
in
cl
u
d
in
g
th
e
‘‘
d
o
n
’t
k
n
o
w
’’
o
p
ti
o
n
w
er
e
p
ro
v
id
ed
.
N
o
n
-r
es
p
o
n
se
is
co
d
ed
if
th
e
a
ss
et
ty
p
e
is
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
,
b
u
t
th
e
a
m
o
u
n
t
w
a
s
n
o
t
p
ro
v
id
ed
.
‘‘
D
o
n
’t
k
n
o
w
’’
is
co
d
ed
if
th
e
a
ss
et
ty
p
e
is
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
,
b
u
t
th
e
a
m
o
u
n
t
w
a
s
n
o
t
p
ro
v
id
ed
.
‘‘
D
o
n
’t
k
n
o
w
’’
is
co
d
ed
if
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
y
es
/
n
o
a
n
sw
er
w
a
s
p
o
si
ti
v
e
a
n
d
th
e
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
re
p
li
ed
th
a
t
th
e
ex
a
ct
a
m
o
u
n
t
is
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
G
S
O
E
P
.
Item non-response on income and wealth questions 529
Explanatory variables. Equation 1 (see Sect. 2.2) describes individual response
behavior as determined by the costs and beneﬁts of providing an answer, the
characteristics of respondent and interviewer, as well as by their interactions.
Clearly, it is not possible to actually measure individual costs and beneﬁts in
answering a given question. Therefore, the characteristics of respondents and
interviewers are interpreted in the light of their eﬀect on cost and beneﬁt
considerations.
In our item non-response model we control for characteristics of the
respondent-interviewermatch, such as equal labormarket status and schooling,
for the age diﬀerence, aswell as for the gender combination between interviewer
and respondent. We also measure whether a household’s interviewer has
changed since the last survey, which should increase item non-response. The
remaining covariates were chosen as indicators of relevant costs and beneﬁts in
an interview situation. Education, as indicator of a respondent’s cognitive
ability, is measured using three categorical indicators.16 We consider an indi-
cator for whether respondents work in the public sector, control for household
size, the size of a person’s town of residence and for whether a respondent
answers a questionnaire partly in writing as opposed to orally.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Heterogeneity in item non-response behavior and its determinants
Item non-response and its determinants across outcomes. To describe the
relevance of alternative explanatory mechanisms behind item non-response
and to investigate outcome-speciﬁc heterogeneity in item non-response we
pool the outcome data described in Tables 1 and 2 and consider outcome
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in the speciﬁcaton of our logit model.17 The ﬁxed eﬀect
controls are jointly highly signiﬁcant (see Table 3) and reﬂect heterogeneity
across outcomes, even after controlling for covariates. Adding outcome
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to the model increases the pseudo (McFadden) R2 from
about 0.018 (not presented) to almost 0.14.18 The magnitudes of the esti-
mated item-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (which we do not present to save space)
reﬂect the descriptive evidence in Tables 1 and 2.
The estimation yields a number of statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. The
ﬁrst group of variables describes the gender combination of respondent and
interviewer with two males as the reference. The coeﬃcients indicate positive
associations between female interviewers and item non-response. If we
assume that it is easier to avoid an answer in front of a female than a male the
pattern ﬁts the rational choice model’s predictions.
16 Low schooling is coded for mandatory schooling, medium schooling for the German
Realschule, and high schooling for degrees preparing for academic studies.
17 To render the bivariate non-response outcome measure of the income variables comparable to
the multivariate outcome measure of the wealth indicators we dropped those wealth observations
with ‘‘don’t know’’ answers from the sample. The results presented below justify this procedure.
18 This result holds in smaller subsamples as well, when we pool outcomes at the individual,
household, or wealth level only (not presented to save space).
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The next set of indicators describes the employment status of the participants.
Overall, there seems to be a weak tendency for non full time employed
respondents to refuse an answer. Again, the ﬁnding can be explained within
the rational choice model: If the earnings of part-time workers are
comparatively low, and these respondents prefer to indicate personal labor
market success to the interviewer they may choose non-response. Alterna-
tively, the intertemporal variance in part-time workers’ earnings might be
much higher compared to full-time employees’. In that case, the higher
number of refused answers might be due to the higher cognitive challenge in
providing an ever changing ﬁgure for an answer. The evidence on the role of
the interviewers’ employment status suggests that data quality is lowest when
interviewers are full time employed. We ﬁnd no indication of matching eﬀects
based on interviewer and respondent employment status.
Similarly, having respondents and interviewers with equal schooling does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results. The estimates indicate a positive correla-
tion between both low respondent and interviewer schooling and non-
responses.
Older respondents seem to be slightly more prone to item non-response
than younger individuals.19 We also ﬁnd some evidence that having inter-
viewers who are younger than the respondents reduces non-response. In
contrast to the literature we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant non-response eﬀect of an
interviewer change. Possibly the change of an interviewer has strong eﬀects on
unit non-response (cf., Rendtel 1995) such that item non-response cannot
even be observed. Overall, public sector employees seem to be signiﬁcantly
less likely to refuse an answer.
Based on the lower disutility involved, one might expect more non-re-
sponses among those who completed the questionnaire without an inter-
viewer. This is conﬁrmed only by an imprecisely estimated coeﬃcient. Rural
residence similarly has no statistically signiﬁcant correlation with response
behavior, and the household size eﬀect yields as expected that individuals
living in larger households have signiﬁcantly lower non-response rates.20
Since non-response rates diﬀer between wealth and income outcomes, we
investigate in a second step whether this is a level eﬀect or whether the
covariate eﬀects diﬀer across the two outcome groups. We reestimate the
ﬁxed eﬀects model, now adding a full set of interaction terms (I) which
indicate whether a wealth or income measure is observed.21 The model is thus:
uij ¼ cija1 þ bija2 þ Xib1 þ Wmb2 þ ðX i WmÞb3
þ cijIja01 þ bijIja02 þ X i Ijb01 þ W mIjb02 þ ðX i WmÞIjb03 þ lij
19 This corresponds to the predictions of the cognitive model and corroborates the ﬁndings of
Kna¨uper et al. (1997) who showed that diﬀerences in cognitive ability may lead to diﬀerential
response patterns particularly among older respondents.
20 In preliminary analyses we estimated these speciﬁcations separately on a wide variety of
individual outcome measures. Whereas there was some heterogeneity in the correlation patterns
across outcomes the overall outcomes correspond to those described for the pooled model (for
details see Riphahn and Serﬂing 2002).
21 In these estimations we treat ‘‘income from interest and dividends’’ as an indicator of wealth
holdings and group it with the outcomes listed in Table 2.
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The explanatory power of the model increases signiﬁcantly with the full set of
interaction terms added, of which a number are statistically signiﬁcant (see
last columns of Table 3).
The results suggest that the increase in non-response for female inter-
viewers is somewhat more pronounced for wealth outcomes. A clear pattern
appears for the schooling indicators: Whereas item non-response on income
measures increases with higher respondent education, we ﬁnd the opposite
result for wealth outcomes. The diﬀerences are signiﬁcant and diﬃcult to
interpret. If education is correlated with a respondent’s level of information
about wealth, then the high response propensity might be explained by cog-
nitive ability. However, given that the same individuals should also be well
informed on their income one can only speculate that they consider income as
more private information.
The age eﬀects seem to diﬀer between income and wealth outcomes. The
non-response probability on income measures increases with respondent age.
The eﬀect disappears for wealth questions. The negative correlation between
the respondent-interviewer age diﬀerence and item non-response - pointed out
above - seems to be based mostly on wealth outcomes.
Diﬀerences in covariate associations with non-response probabilities by
outcome are observable also for the remaining variables: While the change of
an interviewer increased non-responses for incomes, it reduces them for
wealth. The beneﬁcial eﬀect of public sector employment on the propensity to
provide ﬁnancial information seems to be limited to incomes: Since the
earnings of public sector workers in Germany typically follow publicly
available pay scales, it is possible that these workers are more open about
their income, as these may be public knowledge anyway. When it comes to
wealth, however, their privacy protection instincts seem to be the same as for
anyone else. Living in a small town’ is correlated with signiﬁcantly lower non-
response on wealth while the eﬀect on income is insigniﬁcant. Also the neg-
ative eﬀect of household size diﬀers signiﬁcantly for the two outcomes. Thus,
non-response is heterogeneous in frequency and correlation patterns across
outcomes.22
4.2. A closer look at ‘‘don’t know’’ answers
In this section we investigate whether answering ‘‘don’t know’’ is an inde-
pendent outcome, or whether this response can be grouped with valid
responses or with non-responses. As described above we ﬁrst apply a Haus-
man test to determine whether the unobserved determinants of item non-
response are correlated with those of valid answers or outright non-responses.
We start with a sample that pools all of the outcomes presented in Table 2,
combining the 11,486 observations of the ‘‘total’’ row. Then, we consider
22 Since the combination of outcomes considered in the sample used in Table 3 is somewhat
arbitrary, we performed robustness tests by reestimating the same models for alternative outcome
subsets. There most coeﬃcients have the same sign, but their statistical signiﬁcance is not always
robust to modiﬁcations of the sample.
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some of the wealth outcomes separately to determine whether the results for
the pooled sample are robust.
The evidence presented in Table 4 seems to be strong and clear: The null
hypothesis that the IIA assumption holds cannot be rejected in any of the
tests. The unobservables do not seem to be correlated and therefore ‘‘don’t
know’’ answers are valid and independent alternatives to informative
responses and to non-responses in the IIA sense.
Next, we perform the (Hill-) Cramer-Ridder test of whether the observable
covariates have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent eﬀects on the propensity to provide a
‘‘don’t know’’ answer relative to either valid answers or to outright non-
response. The test compares the multinomial logit slope coeﬃcients to those
of a model where the slope parameters for don’t know and one alternative
answer option are restricted to be identical. Again, we perform it ﬁrst for the
sample of pooled wealth measures and then for some of the wealth items
separately.
The evidence (see Table 5) is clear: In all cases we can reject the
hypotheses that the coeﬃcients of the ‘‘don’t know’’ answer are identical to
those of valid responses at high levels of statistical signiﬁcance. For all
outcomes but ?market value of an owned home’ we reject that the coeﬃcients
of the ‘‘don’t know’’ answer are identical to those of valid responses mostly at
the one percent level. We read this evidence as indicative of the independence
of ‘‘don’t know’’ answers: Typically, observable determinants of response
behavior have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent impacts on the three considered
outcomes.
Jointly the two tests suggest that neither by their observable nor by their
unobservable determinants ‘‘don’t know’’ answers are correlated with - and
therefore likely substitutes of - valid answers or complete item non-responses.
These ﬁndings can be misleading if they are completely due to the limited
statistical power of the tests. Thus, it would be interesting to complement the
statistical argument presented here using evidence from experiments.
Unfortunately that is not possible with the GSOEP data. We conclude that
‘‘don’t know’’ answers can be viewed as independent outcomes in their own
right. Missing values due to ‘‘don’t know’’ replies cannot simply be mixed
Table 4. Summary of Hausman test results
Dependent variable Number of obs. Test-statistic p-value
Pooled wealth measures 11,486 0.29 1.00
Stocks and bonds 636 0.00 1
Home loan savings 1,001 0.00 1
Savings account 2,064 0.00 1
Owned home: Market value 1,065 0.00 1.00
Total household wealth 2,427 3.23 1
Note: 1 The test statistic takes on a negative value, which can be interpreted as strong evidence
against rejecting the null hypothesis that the IIA assumption holds (Hausman and McFadden
1984, p. 1226 Footnote 4, or Stata 7 Manual volume 2 p. 13).
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP.
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with item non-responses. The test results show that the two processes are
determined by diﬀerent observable and unobservable mechanisms.23
‘Therefore, our results yield additional support to the conclusion of Juster
and Smith (1997) in their analysis of responses to follow-up bracket questions
in surveys (p.1272): ‘‘This marked contrast in the behavior of DK and REF
responses suggests that the two need to be handled separately when impu-
tations are being done’’, where DK represents don’t know and REF refusal to
respond.
5. Conclusions
Even though item non-response aﬀects every analysis using survey data, it has
found little attention as a behavioral phenomenon in its own right.24 In this
study we present a number of results that are new to the literature. The
empirical literature on item non-response is limited and generally focuses on
Table 5. Summary of Hill-Cramer-Ridder test results
Dependent variable No. of obs. H0: b
Don’t Know
= bResponse
H0: b
Don’t Know
= bItem-Nonresponse
LR1 LR1
(DF2; p-value) (DF2; p-value)
Pooled wealth measures 11,486 215.34 162.52
(21; 0.000) (21; 0.000)
Stocks and bonds 636 39.51 42.18
(20; 0.006) (20; 0.003)
Home loan savings 1,001 60.81 100.98
(20; 0.000) (20; 0.000)
Savings account 2,064 65.75 45.87
(20; 0.000) (20; 0.001)
Owned home: market value 1,065 65.31 21.44
(17; 0.000) (17; 0.207)
Total household wealth 2,427 87.74 31.24
(21; 0.000) (21; 0.070)
Notes: 1 LR represents the value of the likelihood ratio test statistic.
2 The degrees of freedom diﬀer accross wealth measures, since due to collinearity and small
number of cases the full model (see Table 2) could not be estimated. The full model was estimated
for the pooled wealth measures and for total household wealth. For testing Savings, Home Loan
Savings and Stocks and Bonds, the indicator of missing respondent schooling was omitted. In the
case of ownership of occupied ﬂat or home, the indicators of self administered survey and higher
respondent schooling were also dropped from the econometric model.
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP.
23 This conﬁrms Juster and Smith (1997), who showed that ‘‘don’t know’’ respondents and non-
respondents diﬀer in their willingness to provide responses to ‘‘bracket’’ questions (i.e. follow-up
questions asked when initially no valid response is received): Whereas almost 80 % of initial
‘‘don’t know’’ respondents provided complete bracket data, the share among non-respondents
reached only 40 %.
24 Certainly a vast statistical literature has developed following Rubin’s inﬂuential work on
missing data imputation (Rubin 1987). However the issue there is to ﬁnd the best possible
correction given that the data is missing. Our interest is to explain at least in part why it is missing
in order to improve data collection eﬀorts.
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measures of labor income. We address this limitation by investigating the
frequency and determinants of item non-response for a variety of ﬁnancial
outcomes. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity in non-response intensities. This
conclusion from descriptive statistics is conﬁrmed in regressions of non-
response behavior where much explanatory power derives from the consid-
eration of outcome-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. We conﬁrm several results of the
literature regarding correlates of item non-response. An investigation of the
homogeneity of non-response determinants across outcomes yields new
insights: estimating a fully interacted model shows clearly that a number of
the established correlates of item non-response behavior vary depending on
the speciﬁc item under consideration.
We investigate whether the match of interviewer and respondent charac-
teristics aﬀects the quality of survey outcomes. Robust ﬁndings on this matter
would be valuable to reduce the cost and to increase the quality of infor-
mation gathered from social surveys. The analysis yields that non-response
rates tend to be higher if the interviewer is female in particular when the
respondent is female as well. Having a respondent and an interviewer with the
same employment status or the same educational level does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect non-response outcomes. However, our measures of employment and
educational attainment may be too rough to reﬂect the impact of potential
matching eﬀects on non-response behavior. With respect to age diﬀerences
there is some evidence that matching a younger interviewer to an older
respondent may increase response propensities particularly with respect to
wealth outcomes. Interestingly, the personal acquaintance of the respondent
with the interviewer is beneﬁcial for wealth but not for income items.
Our third research question concerns ‘‘don’t know’’ answers in ques-
tionnaires. A Hausman test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives
assumption and the (Hill-)Cramer-Ridder test suggest that ‘‘don’t know’’
responses cannot be viewed as a subcategory of valid answers nor as
comparable to item non-response. Therefore, simple statements as to how
oﬀering ‘‘don’t know’’ answer options aﬀects the set of valid answers are not
possible.
In the end, researchers have to acknowledge that the group of respondents
who refuse to answer a survey question is not a random draw from the
population, that the group varies depending on the question looked at, that
those answering ‘‘don’t know’’ diﬀer from non-respondents, and that simply
omitting these individuals from the analysis may well bias results. Much
attention has been devoted to developing appropriate imputation mecha-
nisms when data is missing. Our results suggest that imputation procedures
should diﬀerentiate between missing values due to ‘‘don’t know’’ answers and
due to outright non-response.
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